Part III

Before I start, a warning - this post is written rather more loosely
than I would like to have to defend, but given some of the things that
have been said recently, I thought I needed to post *something*. Most of
what I say in the following has been said in earlier posts, sometimes
more explicitly. This one is longer, and hopefully ties a few threads
together.

Unless I am *very* much mistaken (and I say that happy to be corrected),
nervous systems will probably turn out to be little more than organic,
highly plastic, configuration systems which enable us to *do* all that
we are able to do during our brief life-spans. If that sounds trite,
it's supposed to, as I think far too much awe is shown with reference to
"cognitive" neuroscience, and that much of what we see done under its
auspices amounts to no more than the most recent incarnation of
something which we humans are have long been all too readily disposed to
- i.e. hubrism. First we were special because God made us in his
omniscient image, then we were better than other animals because of our
superior "intelligence", and now some of us revere what is done by those
who we like to think are clever people who work on the "mind" and the
seat of cleverness, the brain. Sadly. I reckon most of it's verbal
rubbish, and the guardians of the great rubbish dump are those who call
themselves "Cognitive Neuroscientists".

Most reputable neuroscience is like most of the rest of anatomy and
physiology, it's just in a different part of the body and it's main
utility is in medicine. If I'm correct (and this is part III of a series
which has quite a lot of research behind it), an awful lot of people
waste an awful lot of their lives being distracted by what logically and
practically can not be abstracted from behaviour. In trying to do so
they actually just end up generating other behaviours and in so doing,
confuse both themselves and gullible others in the process. A lot of
what passes as explanation is, in fact, really just elaborated
*repetition*, albeit disguised repetition. In the case of verbal
behaviour, this is a distinctly human form of reinforcement which
increases the critical mass of the behaviour in question thereby giving
it salience or emphasis. We basically explain something by saying the
same thing in another way, and where this goes awry is in the careless
use of metaphor. .
In higher animals, brains are multi-modal and parallel. This is
trivially true. Much of what's behaviourally configured runs in parallel
and at many levels within each modality - and this is quite literally
the case in terms of neuroanatomy and its physiology. The sub-systems
which comprise the central nervous system are multiple neural networks
which subserve what some people refer to as "cognitive" behaviours.
These are largely mediated by the twelve cranial nerves which apart form
the olfactory and optic nerves begin in the medulla/pons. The dominant
behaviours (because they are the most salient) and the ones which
interest most people who like to talk about these matters, are all of
our auditory, visual, gustatory, olfactory, haptic, proprioceptive and
kinaesthetic *behaviours*. There are, I suggest, millions of fragments
of these being executed all of the time. Some of these operate (to some
degree) quite independently of one another up to some level (e.g the
entorhinal cortical or neocortical areas), which is why we so readily
give those behaviours separate *names* of course, but however detailed
this gets in terms of cortical columns and connections, this is really,
when it comes to what most people are really interested in here, all
quite trivial and distracting - it's just details. The science for
functionally anatomizing all of the above is indeed neuroscience, but
this is no home for the "mind", and in terms of what is done in
neuroscience, it really is, as those who have worked in it will attest,
far more "geography" than "psychology".

From this perspective, our behaviours or actions (operants), along with
the outcome of those actions (feedback from our operants) just end up
reconfiguring a system of billions of synapses more or less as
"switches" (think of an EPROM or EEPROM and how they work, but keep an
eye on the I/O lines). I say "re-configuring", because that bit is
important. Much that we do is not new, and where it is, we get tend to
get very frightened and try to minimize it duration or our exposure. We
literally just can't cope in such situations. There's too much to learn
in too little time and that's dangerous. Our repertoire of switches is
activated and minimally re-configured by patterns of surface stimulation
(our "being-in-the-world" or Dasein as existentialists like Heidegger
described us in his "Being and Time" back in the 1920s albeit in a
rather arcane way). We are thrown into all of that from birth or before,
and all the way up to death we spend most of our time trying to minimize
the stress of all of that - even the sensation seekers amongst us.

Our brains allow for almost limitless degrees of freedom in the
behaviours shaped or constrained by the environmental contingencies we
find ourselves embedded within, initially through no choice of our own.
We learn our first language, its dialect, its tone etc largely without
noticing. Similarly, we learn all sorts of other ways of behaving from
those we trust implicitly, and (note) we learn to say all sorts of
things which aren't true very early on. It starts with what we call
play, which really develops dramatically when we can talk about things
that are no longer in our immediate environment - ie once we start
sophisticated operant conditioning.

Initially this is quite meagre, but by early childhood, we get pretty
good at it - we get a "mind" of our own so we say. But this of course,
is just a figure of speech, we don't really get a "mind", we just talk
about some configurations of our conditioned behaviours that way because
we don't have a better way of talking about it until we go to school or
college and are taught better, more precise and explicit ways of doing
so as behaviour scientists.

The constraints which operate to shape or direct behaviour are basically
what behavioural science attempts to explicate, but it has to be said,
these contingencies, writ large, comprise what we call culture. The
scope of culture is immense, and we are not the only species to have
cultures - other primates do. Sometimes we study them, but we have made
far more progress studying microcosms with infra-humans in the field of
Operant and Classical Conditioning which use Skinner boxes and Shuttle
boxes etc. I've said in the past that something like the Rescorla-Wagner
(1971) model of *classical* conditioning (although I don't see why it
should be restricted to that) is not a bad place for those interested,
as the basic equation captures the hard won empirical data accumulated
over decades of research. When explained (somewhat redundantly) it
expresses very nicely (as it should) what conditioning is all about (cf.
what I said about explanation). It is, however, merely one of the latest
models (though now over 30 years old) in the evolution of a long line of
statistical learning theoretical models which were developed in the
1950s in the wake of Hull's work (although Estes credited both Guthrie
and Skinner). What I say in this post is, incidentally, largely Guthrian
in spirit - though anyone interested might want to look at Restle and
especially Estes as it was in this climate that Chomsky, aided and
abetted by Miller (largely on the back of Information Theory), sadly
diverted psychology down a blind alley in my view.

Let's return to the "switching" idea - and don't for now start thinking
about Turing, or Chomsky or Rosenblatt or anyone who has said things
about automata, information theory, recursive function theory,
artificial neural networks or computers. Wittgenstein and Russell and
Whitehead started all that with a little help from Frege at the
beginning of the last century and you'll just have to accept that I know
that stuff probably as well as anyone else reading this. What I'm
drawing attention to is something slightly different, and something
quite at odds with "cognitivism".

At particular space time coordinates T1 lets say we are configured in
X1,X2...Xn states (or ways) as we operate within that environment. At
that time-place, all the synapses configured at that time are a function
of what we *do* in those situations. This covers what our visual,
auditory etc systems do. What we do determines how the energy falls on
our sensory surfaces, and how it feeds back by proprioceptors. Think of
all of this in terms of the Rescorla-Wagner model, although any delta
rule which includes *all* configurations would suffice
(Va=alpha.beta(lambda -Vx). Find out what psychologists mean by
prediction here.

At some later space-time, T2, we return to much the "same" situation,
and so naturally find ourselves in much the same state, or
configuration. We find ourselves behaving much the same way that we
behaved when we were bombarded with the original stimulation. That's
because most of the situation has not changed, if it did, we would have
to change ("learn"), and we don't tend to like doing that, so we do it
relative to what's already familiar (almost completely unaware of the
fact that we are doing so). What stops us is neophobia, an unconditioned
fear response which limits what we process - possibly through opioid
peptide dampers in our primary sensory nuclei of afferent pathways - but
again, the details don't matter.

We have for centuries called returning to the original subsets of
configurations "recognizing something familiar", but we aren't actually
using *memory* in the way we've been taught to speak mentalistically
using the somewhat treacherous idioms of propositional attitude. They're
vestigial of our old hubristic folk-lore. What we are really doing is
just putting ourselves back into the same "configuration" or "pattern"
that we were in originally, and we just say that we "remember" (think of
what distraction tasks comprise, ie how they are effected). There are
always going to be slight changes between the stimulus conditions of T1
and T2 (which are themselves rather arbitrary relational referents, as
the physical world changes, we change too). We always move from
"context" to "context" or state to state in a continuous stream of
behaviour, so inevitably, some of what we do (see, hear, etc) changes
along the way. Some, fortunately, doesn't. Even more fortunately for
what we call science, there are some stable or invariant relations in
the world which accounts for natural selection, and species emerging and
surviving. The same occurs as we move through life, some patterns emerge
as stable and reliable with experience, and we push that to its limits
in what we euphemistically call "science" (just a better method of
knowing where the method is extensional and therefore more publicly
accountable).

The important thing to note is that there are going to be billions of
"switches" which are set in an ever changing pattern or configuration
and when we find ourselves in configurations which share
characteristics, we talk about "similarities" between situations or
contexts. This can be verbal, visual, auditory, motor - anything in
fact, but these are just verbal operants, for discriminations. Even more
important than the switches or state of configuration is the fact that
this is all a function of environmental contingencies. The enduring
feeling of self-hood "I" is just because we *don't* have stable
reference classes which allow us to see how we change (apart from public
behaviours like seeing ourselves in mirrors or photographs etc - which a
lot of us avoid anyway - especially as we get older!). Again, all of
that is trivial and generally quite well known, the important bit is the
nature of the switches or reconfiguration, and the fact that what's
important is not the brain so much, as the contingencies or culture
which shapes the settings of those switches. That's the point that has
been laboured here for some time now - and it is worth labouring in the
current culture.

There's no reason why we shouldn't frequently find ourselves in
configurations where the original conditions are not *directly*
stimulating us. That's what we call "conditioned seeing" etc
("imagining" etc). Our brains are configured by direct environmental
stimulation, and our brains therefore stay in those configurations even
when we are no longer being directly simulated. This is private
behaviour, and it is different from public behaviour only in terms of
differences in the presence or absence of the reinforcing community, as,
like it or not, most of our behaviour is learned socially - this is
obviously true for language but less obviously so for much of the rest
that comes with it. The conditions which account for that are those
which have been explicated in controlled microcosms like the Skinner Box
or Shuttle Box, ie by these who have empirically studied "conditioning".

It's those enduring "states" or "configurations" which account for *why*
we talk about "recognition" when we change state, because instead of the
states having to be set anew, they're already set from last time. We can
even instantiate those configurations of behaviour when we close our
eyes or fall asleep, ie when other active, dominating more salient
behaviours don't overshadow our conditioned behaviours. Try doing it
when you're highly stimulated.

None of this is "mental", and it's misleading to refer to it as
"cognitive" (except perhaps to contrast some classes of behaviour with
others). As briefly mentioned above, in the case of conditioned seeing,
hearing and speaking, the behaviours involve our twelve cranial nerves
and the musculature of the head/neck, and amongst those, the brain's
switches are particularly well developed for elaborate configuring when
it comes to visuo/auditory-motor behaviours (homo sapiens' dominant
means of acting upon the world). But the extrapyramidal system is also
part of this, and we are experts at tool
manipulation/translocation/locomotion along with the cranial behaviours.

Whilst behavioural scientists study all of this as operant conditioning,
in examining the contingencies which control or shape those behaviours,
they don't treat them as being *in* the head any more than "a dent in a
can" is *in* the can, or the links made or broken when an EPROM is
programmed are *in* the EPROM (think of a hard disk's state is changed
by the heads). The old empiricist term "impression" might be a suitable
word if it had not been mauled so badly over the centuries, stuffed *in*
"the mind" and now "the brain" as "memories" (the pits on a RW CDROM may
be a better analogy but it's because people forget how these have to be
read that they get seduced by the "storage" idea - they forget *how*
they are part of, or embedded within a wider system and talk of memory
is a mentalistic metaphor).

So, to recapitulate a little, I reckon "all" that neuroscience is going
to show us in the end is how all of the bodily systems are wired
together to enable these billions of switches or configurations to be
set to enable what are in the final analysis ever more elaborated
defensive behaviours throughout our brief life-spans. These behaviours
only makes sense in relation to an environment most of the time (see
what happens in dreams, sensory deprivation, and when we trust our
conditioned behaviours too much - e.g. "clinical" judgement where we
think "intuitively" rather than actuarially or extensionally).

These configurations or patterns (in their details) are idiosyncratic or
unique to each of us, but this doesn't matter as we learn to talk from a
public, social community - and this is about behaviour. How else could
people ever learn to agree on word usage except through reference to
what's public? When we stop living, this all breaks down irretrievably
- the plug is pulled. There's no conceivable possibility of passing
"memories" or "configurations" between people other than in the way that
we think we do between computers or "storage" devices, because we only
think we do that because we fail to see how we *program* and *use* them.
Our I/O pathways are not conduits for "information" to flow along. We
talk as if that happens in computers but this is an illusion which comes
from our pervasive use of metaphor and mentalistic semantics. if you
look closely, this is just the way a lot of people who *don't* have a
sound background in behavioural science talk about computers and other
cultural artefacts we have created. However, all of our technology and
cultural artefacts are in fact ways of implementing the extensional
stance, ie ways of programming behaviour so that what we do is more
reliable and predictable, and computers are but one of those artefacts,
albeit ones which we have been most *explicit* about.

Perhaps those with a passion for "Artificial Intelligence" may not have
considered the extent to which *all* of our culture *is* how we program
behaviour, and that comprises what we vaguely refer to as
"intelligence". Expecting this to exclusively emerge or be instantiated
"artificially" in computers or robots alone is, as I've said many times
in c.a.p. possibly just a naive consequence of a failure to grasped the
nature and scope of behaviour and how it is a function of our
environment.

Our science and technology is our "intelligence" or intelligent
behaviour.
--
David Longley

"David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:QFJfeZHSY8cAFwYY@longley.demon.co.uk...
> [...]

Whence arises Autonomy?
How can Socialization Teach Autonomy?
Autonomy ignores Socialization.

Whence arises Creativity?
How can Socialization Teach Creativity?
Creativity Creates what's not in Socialization.

Whence arises Curiousity.
How can Socialization Teach Curiosity?
Curiosity seeks what's not in Socialization.

Whence arises Free Will?
How can Socialization Teach Free Will?
Free Will is Free of Socialization.

Whence arises Directionality?
How can Socialization Teach Directionality?
Directionality directs Socialization.

Else, there'd be no Autonomy,
no Creativity,
no Curiosity,
no Free Will,
and, no Progress.

So, what Determines Directionality?

k. p. collins

ken" <kpaulc@[remove]earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:IlQcc.4$k05.0@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.ne t...
> "David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:QFJfeZHSY8cAFwYY@longley.demon.co.uk...
> > [...]
> [...]

> So, what Determines Directionality?

'blindly'-automated TD E/I-minimization, within the
"special topological homeomorphism of [...] nervous
systems" [AoK, "Short Paper"].

Remember?

"Never say "TD E/I-minimization without thinking,
`Directionality'."

Given Directionality [the Internal Freame of Reference;
IFR], Autonomy, Creativity, Curiosity, Free Will, etc.,
can happen in ways that're Independent of Socialization.

'behaviorism' is 'blind' to all of this stuff that derives,
solely, in the neural Topology.

k. p. collins

On Wed, 7 Apr 2004 10:12:50 +0100, David Longley
<David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>Unless I am *very* much mistaken (and I say that happy to be corrected),
>nervous systems will probably turn out to be little more than organic,
>highly plastic, configuration systems which enable us to *do* all that
>we are able to do during our brief life-spans.

Who says anything different?

> What we are really doing is
>just putting ourselves back into the same "configuration" or "pattern"
>that we were in originally, ...

Careful now, you almost said, "state".

>Our science and technology is our "intelligence" or intelligent
>behaviour.

n.s.

So OK, what happened to the "extensionalism" in the subject line?

>knowing where the method is extensional and therefore more publicly
....
>think "intuitively" rather than actuarially or extensionally).
....
>cultural artefacts are in fact ways of implementing the extensional

OK, maybe this is the point:

>However, all of our technology and
>cultural artefacts are in fact ways of implementing the extensional
>stance, ie ways of programming behaviour so that what we do is more
>reliable and predictable, and computers are but one of those artefacts,
>albeit ones which we have been most *explicit* about.

Well hey, that's close to making sense. "Extensional stance" is cute,
I like it, but who holds that stance, the agent or the observer? I'd
say the agent, and I suspect you would say the observer. Right?

J.

David Longley wrote:

> Part III

[snip interesting presentation]
>
> Perhaps those with a passion for "Artificial Intelligence" may not have
> considered the extent to which *all* of our culture *is* how we program
> behaviour, and that comprises what we vaguely refer to as
> "intelligence". Expecting this to exclusively emerge or be instantiated
> "artificially" in computers or robots alone is, as I've said many times
> in c.a.p. possibly just a naive consequence of a failure to grasped the
> nature and scope of behaviour and how it is a function of our environment.

Perhaps ... but there are many kinds of intelligence ... the kind I am
interested in programs useful behavior recognizing that the Internet is
rapidly becoming our intellectual environment.

>
> Our science and technology is our "intelligence" or intelligent behaviour.

That is just your bias. There are many highly functioning and
successful humans who are not contributing to our science and
technology. Do you claim these people are being intelligent only
insofar as their behavior interacts with science and technology?

patty

David Longley wrote:

> Part III
>

Where I have questions which have never been answered about your your
usage of the word "Extensionalism" in this context. Please refer to
<http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=AlVac.54971%24JO3.34795%40attbi_s04>
where I asked the question: "Can we define 'extensional contexts' by
substituting 'ability' for 'failure' in criteria 1 & 2 above ??" You
have never answerd that question.

Now let's take an extensional approach to determine how this word
'Extensionalism' is actually being used tody. To do that we can read
the following context:
<http://www.google.com/search?q=Extensionalism>.

Now the results of my reading in that context leads me to conclude that
an answer of 'yes' to my question above would lead to a eccentric
definiton of this term. So is the answer to my question 'No' ??

patty

Hi patty,

"patty" <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net> wrote in message
news:utYcc.89483$w54.520335@attbi_s01...
> [...]

> Now let's take an extensional approach to
> determine how this word 'Extensionalism' is
> actually being used tody. To do that we
> can read the following context:
> <http://www.google.com/search?q=Extensionalism>.
> [...]

I read "Ontological Extensionalism" at

http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalr...SCR&page=WSCR_
060_WSCR_Glossary&subpage=WSCR_190_Ontological_Ext ensionalism

~"Recalcitrant language" results from the fact
that Truth is not 'atomistic', but Infinitely-gaded.

That is, as one 'moves toward' Truth, one sees
Truth increasingly, but never, in any way, Com-
pletely, unless one sees =all= Truth [unless one
becomes Omniscient].

Another way of coming at the same thing is that,
as one 'moves toward' Truth, Truth becomes in-
creasingly-more Uniformly-Integrated, every-
thing in-Truth tending toward Uniform-mutual-
Reference. That is, as one 'moves toward' Truth,
everything in-Truth increasingly cross-references
everything else in-Truth - each thing in-Truth in-
creasingly 'addresses' all of Truth.

'language' is "recalcitrant' because it 'chops-off'
the Gradient, inherent, artificially terming this or
that to 'be complete' in and of itself, when, be-
cause Truth is Infinitely-graded, this or that is
just an 'approximation' of Truth.

'language' does this largely be-cause 'language'
remains largely a void with respect to under-
standing how and why 'language' is produced
within nervous systems, and, importantly, be-
cause nervous systems continuously calculate
the energy-consumption costs of progress in
'moving toward' Truth, "calling the grapes sour"
when it's actually just the nervous system's hav-
ing 'decided' that it has 'moved toward' Truth
'sufficiently'. [For those who have AoK, see
the discussion of the "volitional diminishing-re-
turns decision" in Ap7.]

Cheers, patty, ken [k. p. collins]

ken wrote:
> Hi patty,
>
> "patty" <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net> wrote in message
> news:utYcc.89483$w54.520335@attbi_s01...
>
>>[...]
>
>
>>Now let's take an extensional approach to
>>determine how this word 'Extensionalism' is
>>actually being used tody. To do that we
>>can read the following context:
>><http://www.google.com/search?q=Extensionalism>.
>>[...]
>
>
> I read "Ontological Extensionalism" at
>
> http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalr...SCR&page=WSCR_
> 060_WSCR_Glossary&subpage=WSCR_190_Ontological_Ext ensionalism
>
> ~"Recalcitrant language" results from the fact
> that Truth is not 'atomistic', but Infinitely-gaded.
>
> That is, as one 'moves toward' Truth, one sees
> Truth increasingly, but never, in any way, Com-
> pletely, unless one sees =all= Truth [unless one
> becomes Omniscient].
>
> Another way of coming at the same thing is that,
> as one 'moves toward' Truth, Truth becomes in-
> creasingly-more Uniformly-Integrated, every-
> thing in-Truth tending toward Uniform-mutual-
> Reference. That is, as one 'moves toward' Truth,
> everything in-Truth increasingly cross-references
> everything else in-Truth - each thing in-Truth in-
> creasingly 'addresses' all of Truth.
>
> 'language' is "recalcitrant' because it 'chops-off'
> the Gradient, inherent, artificially terming this or
> that to 'be complete' in and of itself, when, be-
> cause Truth is Infinitely-graded, this or that is
> just an 'approximation' of Truth.
>

Well i don't know hot to use that word "Truth" anymore. It refers to
something that not only changes at every moment, but is also relative to
each agent.

> 'language' does this largely be-cause 'language'
> remains largely a void with respect to under-
> standing how and why 'language' is produced
> within nervous systems, and, importantly, be-
> cause nervous systems continuously calculate
> the energy-consumption costs of progress in
> 'moving toward' Truth, "calling the grapes sour"
> when it's actually just the nervous system's hav-
> ing 'decided' that it has 'moved toward' Truth
> 'sufficiently'. [For those who have AoK, see
> the discussion of the "volitional diminishing-re-
> turns decision" in Ap7.]
>
> Cheers, patty, ken [k. p. collins]
>
>

hummm ... who's truth are we moving toward ?

patty

"patty" <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net> wrote in message
news:vc_cc.211132$_w.1982098@attbi_s53...
> ken wrote:
> > Hi patty,
> >
> > "patty" <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net> wrote in message
> > news:utYcc.89483$w54.520335@attbi_s01...
> >
> >>[...]
> >
> >
> >>Now let's take an extensional approach to
> >>determine how this word 'Extensionalism' is
> >>actually being used tody. To do that we
> >>can read the following context:
> >><http://www.google.com/search?q=Extensionalism>.
> >>[...]
> >
> >
> > I read "Ontological Extensionalism" at
> >
> >
http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalr...SCR&page=WSCR_
> > 060_WSCR_Glossary&subpage=WSCR_190_Ontological_Ext ensionalism
> >
> > ~"Recalcitrant language" results from the fact
> > that Truth is not 'atomistic', but Infinitely-gaded.
> >
> > That is, as one 'moves toward' Truth, one sees
> > Truth increasingly, but never, in any way, Com-
> > pletely, unless one sees =all= Truth [unless one
> > becomes Omniscient].
> >
> > Another way of coming at the same thing is that,
> > as one 'moves toward' Truth, Truth becomes in-
> > creasingly-more Uniformly-Integrated, every-
> > thing in-Truth tending toward Uniform-mutual-
> > Reference. That is, as one 'moves toward' Truth,
> > everything in-Truth increasingly cross-references
> > everything else in-Truth - each thing in-Truth in-
> > creasingly 'addresses' all of Truth.
> >
> > 'language' is "recalcitrant' because it 'chops-off'
> > the Gradient, inherent, artificially terming this or
> > that to 'be complete' in and of itself, when, be-
> > cause Truth is Infinitely-graded, this or that is
> > just an 'approximation' of Truth.
> >
>
> Well i don't know hot to use that word "Truth"
> anymore. It refers to something that not only
> changes at every moment, but is also relative to
> each agent.

Since each person's experience can =only= be
Individually-Unique, what each person can per-
ceive of Truth can also only be Individually-Uni-
que.

Folks try to 'bridge' such individual-uniqueness
in social interaction, during which 'images' of
what one person discerns are, more or less,
'shared', and, to the degree of that, there's,
more or less, groupwise 'moving toward' Truth.

'Course, such is only functional - such actually
'moves toward' Truth - to the degree that any
Individual's experience "ranges widely" with re-
spect to Truth - 'moves' in as many of the ways
that one can 'move' with respect to Truth - as
one can.

In doing so, one experiences Truth from many
'different' perspectives, and in the totality of such
experience that ranges-widely with respect to
Truth, there occurs an overall 'mapping', in which
everything within one's experience comes to be
'mapped' with respect to everything else within
one's experience, and, to the degree that such
cross-correlation-'mapping' is, in fact, achieved,
one is able to discern in-Truth, as Truth has shown
itself within one's experience.

> > 'language' does this largely be-cause 'language'
> > remains largely a void with respect to under-
> > standing how and why 'language' is produced
> > within nervous systems, and, importantly, be-
> > cause nervous systems continuously calculate
> > the energy-consumption costs of progress in
> > 'moving toward' Truth, "calling the grapes sour"
> > when it's actually just the nervous system's hav-
> > ing 'decided' that it has 'moved toward' Truth
> > 'sufficiently'. [For those who have AoK, see
> > the discussion of the "volitional diminishing-re-
> > turns decision" in Ap7.]
> >
> > Cheers, patty, ken [k. p. collins]
> >
> >
>
> hummm ... who's truth are we moving toward ?
>
> patty

I've only addressed Truth with respect to how and
why nervous systems process information via 'blind-
ly'-automated "TD E/I-minimization".

Doing such doesn't 'dictate' anything to anyone.

It just gives folks a 'bottom-line' that sets them Free
to actually 'move toward' Truth, rather than "getting
stuck" in interpersonal "inward spirals" [AoK, Ap8].

If you care to know, patty, virtually everyone is
'pissed-off' at 'me' because I did this stuff.

I watched the Movie =Serendipity= earlier today.

There was a scene in which the friend ["Dean"(?)] of
the male lead ["Jonathan"] said to him, "Remember
the philosopher Picatus[phonetic]? He said, `If you
want to improve, be content to be thought foolish
and stupid."

I tried to look-up "Picatus" ["Pycatus", etc.], but
couldn't find any ref. [Anyone know?] Still the saying
is in-Truth - one has to allow one's self to escape
the 'dictates' of 'the way things are supposed to be'
if one is ever to become anything that hasn't existed
before [to "improve" one's self], and, when one so
"escapes", one tends to appear a 'fool' and/or 'stupid'
to everyone else - so, whether the Philosopher Existed
or not, the saying is in-Truth.

What I've done it to explain how and why it's so, in
terms of nervous system function.

That's all of that which is in-Truth that I was discuss-
ing, above.

[I Enjoyed the Movie, BTW. Placed it right up there
with =Groundhog Day= :-]

Sorry if this reply has been too-Whimsical. Good
Movies tend to leave me that way.

Cheers, patty, ken [k. p. collins]

"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:56c0f00a1390ca97c8e672a44fe38ba3@news.teranew s.com...
> [...]

> The answer is, of course, because they
> don't really know shit about how the brain
> mediates behavior.
>
> And the facts of behavior analysis suggest
> immediately some strategic starting points.
> First off, much behavior is not elicited by
> stimuli. It occurs spontaneously (at the
> behavioral level, but not the physiological
> level) and is selected by its consequences.
> [...]

ROFL :-]

k. p. collins